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A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW 2009 ARBITRATION LAW OF LAGOS STATE 
Introduction 
In 2005 a committee was constituted to review the arbitration law in Nigeria. This 
committee produced a draft federal arbitration and conciliation bill and a draft uniform 
state arbitration and conciliation bill for states.' The Lagos State House of Assembly 
became the first state of the Federation to adopt the draft uniform arbitration and 
conciliation bill and promulgated the Lagos State Arbitration Law (LSAL) which was 
signed by the Executive Governor of the state and became effective on 18 March 2009. 
It is the committee's expectation that other states in the Federation will promulgate laws 
in similar terms on arbitration. In addition to this state of affairs there has been a recent 
surge and promotion of various alternative means of resolving disputes in Nigeria. 
These include the spread of multi-door court houses and the numerous arbitration 
associations, conferences and workshops on the subject in ~iger ia . '  It is these that make 
a critique of this law necessary. 
It is useful to state at the outset that Nigeria is a federation composed of a federal 
government with clearly defined powers and jurisdiction, a Federal Capital Territory 
and thirty-six constituent states of which Lagos is one.3 AS a federation operating a 
federal constitution, the jurisdictional and legislative (both substantive and territorial) 
remit of these constituent parts are clearly defined in the ~ons t i tu t ion .~~n  this capacity 
the National Assembly enacted the ACA 'to provide a unified legal framework for ... 
settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration . ..', and to make applicable the New 
York Convention to any award made in Nigeria or any Contracting State arising out of 
international commercial arbi trat i~n.~ Clearly the ACA applies to domestic arbitration 
(Part I), international arbitration (Parts I and 111) and New York Convention awards (s 
54). The ACA therefore governs any international arbitration, with seat in any part of 
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This is the National Committee on the Reform and Harmonisation of Arbitration and ADR Laws in 
Nigeria set up by Chief Bayo Ojo, SAN, then Attorney General and Minister of Justice, on 23 September 
2005. The Committee produced a Report and went into abeyance until recently when a new committee 
was inaugurated to consolidate the various reports on the revision of the laws on arbitration in the country. 
' The surge is particularly more pronounced in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
mediation. 
" See s 2(2) Constitution of the Federal Republ~c of Nigeria 1999 available at htt~://www.nieeria- 
law.ore/ConstitutionOffheFederalRepublicOigeria.htm accessed on 24 August 2010. 
See s 4 1999 Constitution which refers to the Second Schedule containing both the Exclusive and 
Concurrent legislative lists. 
5 As stated in the Preamble to the ACA. Note that the New York Convention here refers to the UN 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. New York 1958 ratified by'- 
Nigeria on 15 June 1970. 
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the Federation and this invariably includes where the seat of such arbitral reference is in 
Lagos State, in addition to domestic arbitrations. 
This article critically examines the scope of the LSAL, its provisions which are 
consistent with part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1 9 8 8 ~  (ACA) and those 
that are novel to statutes on arbitration in Nigeria. This article is divided into three 
sections analysing the relationship between the LSAL and the ACA (I), those 
provisions of the LSAL which are consistent with the ACA (2), the new provisions of 
the LSAL (3) and a conclusion. 
1. LSAL and ACA 
The Lagos State legislator clearly stated the general principles underpinning the new 
law and so to be taken into account in its interpretation. The general principles in 
section 1 (a) and (b) are copied verbatim from sections l(a) and (b) of the English 
Arbitration Act 1 9 9 6 ~  (EAA) while sections l(c) and (d) restate the binding nature of 
the arbitration agreement and the need for all those involved in arbitration to do all that 
is necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of arbitral proceedings. On the remit 
of the LSAL, it states that it applies to all arbitration within Lagos State from 18 May 
2009 (as law of the seat of arbitration, the lex loci arbitri) except where parties have 
expressly opted out of its application by choosing another arbitration law to apply.' The 
first obvious concern raised by this provision is its breadth. It appears to purport to 
apply to international arbitration references with seat in Lagos state. This raises a 
fundamental jurisdictional question of which law such international references will be 
subject to as the law of the seat of arbitration. So where there is a foreign element (for 
example one of the parties to the dispute is foreign) in the arbitral reference, and the 
parties had chosen Lagos as the seat of arbitration, will the ACA or LSAL apply as the 
lex loci arbitri? This is the question answered in this section. 
Examples of provisions where the Lagos State Legislator appears to provide for 
situations affecting international arbitration in the new law abound. This has created 
confusion in this area. These examples can be found in section 2 on parties agreeing 
another arbitration law to apply.9 The same section 2 gives the parties the right to opt 
out of the LSAL by an express choice of another arbitration law to govern the reference. 
The emphasis here is on the arbitration law. It is suggested that as this provision refers 
to the law applicable to the arbitral procedure it must be a reference to the choice of the 
arbitration law of another state of the Federation (and not that of a foreign State). In 
addition to this clarification, a functional interpretation of this section is needed to allow 
the parties choose a set of arbitration rules to govern the dispute subject to the 
mandatory provisions and gap filling role of the LSAL." For the avoidance of doubt the 
The ACA makes provisions on arbitration and conciliation. This article only examines the sections on  
arbitration and more particularly in Part I which deals with domestic arbitration. 
7 It should be observed that the EAA is the arbitration law of  England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
according to s 2 EAA. For purposes of this critique. it should be noted that the EAA applies to a unitary 
legal regime while Lagos state is a constituent part of Nigeria as  a federal state. 
See s 2 LSAL which is a very flexible regime giving the parties the option to subject their arbitral 
reference to another law. Such law must remain subject to the mandatory provisions of the LSAL when 
read in conjunction with s l(b) LSAL. 
The same interpretation will be given to s 5(3) LSAL which refers to 'any law'. 
10 This is so since arbitration rules are not synonymous with or equivalent to arbitration laws. 
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LSAL expressly empowers the dispilling parties to choose any set of arbitration rules to 
goveln their dispute. However in the absence of such choice the arbitration rules of the 
I I Lagos Court of Arbitration shall govetn the arbitral reference. This section recognises 
the right of disputing parties to choose the arbitration rules of their choice to govern 
their reference unlike the ACA which requires parties to apply the arbitration rules 
scheduled to i t  thereby limiting party choice in this regard." Clearly, the choice of 
another arbitration law or arbitration rules will be limited by the mandatory provisions 
of the LSAL. 
Other examples are section 20(3) on applying the law determined by the conflict of law 
rules which the arbitrator considers applicable, sections 55(2)(ii) and 57(2)(b) on 
validity of the arbitration agreement under the law chosen by the parties, references to 
the law of the country where the award was made in section 57(2)(b), or the arbitration 
took place in section 57(2)(g), suspension of the award in the country it was made in 
section 57(2)(h). The question that these provisions raise is whether Lagos State can 
legislate on matters implicating another soverei-gn state; 3. is .the Federal: Government of 
Nigeria that is given the competence to so legislate which it has done in the ACA. To 
further support this view on the reach of the LSAL is the fact that the draft uniform 
arbitration and conciliation bill on which it was based is expressly drafted to provide for 
domestic arbitrations only. 
Under the LSAL the Lagos High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising1' 
while for matters arising under the ACA, 'the High Court of a State, the R g h  Couri of 
the Federal Capital territory, Abuja or the Federal f i g h  Court' all have concurrent 
juri~diction. '~ So, if the Lagos High Court also has jurisdiction to entertain matters 
arising under the ACA the relevant question for disputants will be determining under 
which law to proceed or which law will apply to their application where the seat is in 
Lagos State. Section 60(b) LSAL indicates a possible solution since it expressly 
subjects itself to 'any other Law by virtue of which certain disputes may be submitted to 
arbitration only in accordance with the provisions of that or another Law'. It is therefore 
submitted that where the arbitration is purely domestic, parties can choose to apply 
either under part I of the ACA or the LSAL but where there is an international element 
to the reference, the ACA will apply to the exclusion of the L S A L . ' ? ~ ~  Lagos High 
Court will apply the ACA to international arbitrations and the LSAL to domestic 
arbitrations. 
The LSAL expressly limits the powers of the Lagos High Court to intervene in any 
arbitration sub-ject to it.'?his court plays primarily a supporting role to arbitsation. In 
addition to other powers discussed below. the court is empowered to grant interim 
I I See s 3 l (1)  LSAL. The Lagos Court of Arbitration when commissioned will be a state run arbitration 
institution, enacted into law by the Lapos Court of Arbitration Law 2009. 
"See s 15 ACA and First Schedule to the ACA which states that. .these Rules shall govern any 
arbitration proceedings . . . ' .  
1 .: See s 61(1) LSAL. Note the references to the 'Lagos Court of Arbitration' (for example as appointing 
authority) in the LSAL are to a statutory body which acts as an arbitration institution. 
l 4  See s 57(1) ACA. 
l 5  This law will be the Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Act when the bill is adopted. 
I6 See s 59 LSAL. See also rule 1 Arbitration Application Rules Scheduled to the LSAL for a helpful list 
of applications that can be made to the Court. 
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measures to any party involved i n  arbitration subject to the L S A L , " ~ ~ ~  issue writs of 
subpoena ad test~ficnrtdrrr1i or rlilces teclrrli (basically to summon a witness to give oral 
evidence or testimony or to produce documents). The order of the court will be for the 
witness to appear before the arbitral tribunal itself (and not the court) to give his or her 
evidence. The natural limitation to this is that the person to be compelled is in ~ ige r i a . ' "  
3. Provisions consistent with ACA 
Most of the provisions of the LSAL on the arbitration agreement (2.1), appointment, 
chafienge and replacement of arbitrators (2.2), the arbitral process (2.3), award and 
grounds for setting it aside (2.4) and termination of the proceedings (2.5) are consistent 
with and in some instances contain more detailed provisions which bring much needed 
clarification and certainty to the law than the ACA. The issues discussed in this section 
show no substantial inconsistency between the two laws. 
2.1 Arbitration agreement 
The provisions of the LSAL apply to both arbitration clauses and submission 
agreements.19 It retains the requirement for an arbitration agrsement to be in writing 
with a robust and modem definition of writing2' It also clarifies various situations that 
would lead to the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.2' The LSAL expressly 
requires courts in Lagos state to stay proceedings where 'an action is brought in a matter 
subject to an Arbitration Agreement' on the request of a party made before submission 
of the first statement on the substance of the dispute.22   his provision leaves out from 
the purview of 'talung steps in the proceedings', procedural steps such as applications 
for summary judgment or extension of time." Thus a party can request an anti-suit 
injunction in favour of a valid arbitration agreement at any time before it files a defence 
to the claim. Another point to note here is that the court is required to stay action and 
not reject jurisdiction so that effectively this is a question of a non-suit and not 
termination of the  proceeding^.^^ This is a very important clarification since being 
statutory courts are bound by it and parties who in the face of arbitration agreements 
raise all sorts of tactical objections will no longer exploit any previous loophole. The 
courts in Lagos state will need to give a purposive interpretation to this provision to 
ensure that the desire of parties to settle their dispute through arbitration is honoured. 
2.2 Appointment, challenge and replacement of arbitrators. 
The LSAL empowers the disputing parties to agree the number of arbitrators with the 
default being a sole a r b i t r a t ~ r . ~ ~  The default of a sole arbitrator takes the cost and time 
l7 See  s 21(1) LSAL. 
18 See s 43 LSAL and s 23 ACA. 
19 See  s 3(2) LSAL and s 12(2) ACA which is more detailed and explicit. 
20 See  s 3(3)-(8) LSAL. Since the LSAL is a domestic law as  clarified above, this definition of  writing is 
not impacted by the definition of writing under art II(3) of the Convention on  the Recognition and 
Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (New York Convention). 
2 1 The  LSAL clearly recognises that an arbitration agreement is a contract and so  the provisions in ss 4 & 
5 are atypical of this recognition. 
22 See  s 6(1) LSAL and s 5(1) ACA. 
23 The  English courts recently in, Bilta (UK) Lrd (in liquidntion) 1) Nnzir & Otllers [2010] E W H C  1086 
(Ch); [2010] WLR (D) 129, held that an application for extension of time under s 9 E A A  did not amount 
to  taking steps in the proceedings. 
24 S 5(1) ACA also refers to a stay of proceedings. 
25 See s 7 LSAL and s 6 ACA where the defaulr is three arbitrators. 
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implications of a three-person tribunal into consideration. This is panicularly laudable 
for small and medium sized businesses wishing to arbitrate their commercial disputes. 
The standard methods for appointing arbitrators are retained in the LSAL with the 
Lagos Court of Arbitration given the task to act as an appointing au th~r i t~ .~?hese  
methods are joint appointment of a sole arbitrator by the parties or appointment by an 
appointing authority from a list provided by the In a three member arbitral 
tribunal, each party will be required to appoint one arbitrator and the two party 
appointees will then appoint the third and presiding arbitrator. '"n default, the 
appointing authority will assist with the appointment.'9 o n e  new point to note on the 
appointment of arbitrators is the empowerment of the appointing authority to appoint 
the arbitrator nominated by one party to act as a sole arbitrator where the parties fail to 
agree on the sole arbitrato~. '~ 
The LSAL also makes detailed provi:sion;s for the appointment.and role of arr- umpire3' 
and for multiparty arbitrations,"both of which are not mentioned in the ACA. In 
multiparty references, there are usually more than rwo parties so that allowing each 
party to nominate one arbitrator mean there will possibly be more than three arbitrators 
forming the arbitral tribunal. This has implications for not just costs of the reference but 
also time and decision-malung. The LSAL adopts the general practice in such situations 
which is to allow the parties to group themselves into claimants and respondents as their 
interests permit and then each group will appoint one arbitrator each with the third 
appointed by the two co-arbitrators. If this is not possible or practicable, the LSAL 
provides for the appointing authority to appoint the arbitrators. 
A party can challenge an arbitrator whether or not nominated by him on several grounds. 
These are where he can show that (1). 'circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality and independence', (2) the arbitrator does not 
possess any agreed qualifications, (3) the arbitrator lacks or there is doubt that he 
possesses the capacity (physical and mental) to conduct the proceedings, and (4) where 
the applicant has suffered substantial injustice as a result of the arbitrator's failure to use 
reasonable despatch in the conduct of the proceedings or in making the award.33 The 
first ground is accepted in most jurisdictions and is also found in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, amended 2006 (Model 
~aw1. j '  
26 See for- example s 7 ACA and Emilia Onyema, It~tert~ntiot~al Co~trtrret-cia1 Arbitratiot~ arid the 
Arbitrator's Cor~trclct. Routledge and Cavendish. 2010 at pp 84-10?, 
" See generally s S(3) (a) LSAL. 
2S See generally. s S(4) (a) LSAL. 
" See s S LSAL. Note that under part 1 of the ACA the relevant High Court will make the appointment 
while i n  part 111 (for international references) the appointing authority will assist. 
30 See s 8(3) (b) LSAL. This requirement is slightly different from s 17 EAA which empowers the 
arbitrator so nominated to act as the sole arbitrator. There is no requirement in the EAA for an appointing 
authority to confirm the nomination and appoint him as arbitrator. See B. Harris. R. Planterose and J .  
Tecks. Tile Arbirrntiotl Act 1996: N Co,rl~,~etltat?.. 4"' ed.. Blackwell Pubi, 2010 at pp 97- 100. 
3 1 See s 9 LSAL. The ACA does not make any provisions on umpires. 
" See s 8(2) LSAL. The ACA does not make any provisions on multiparty situations. 
- m 
" See s 10(3) LSAL. Note that the ACA contains only three grounds in s 8(3) on justifiable doubts as to 
his impartiality or independence and lack of agreed qualifications. 
34 See art 13 Model Lau: and art 12 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 as examples. 
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The second ground is predicated on provisions in the LSAL on the qualifications of the 
arbitrator in sections 8(3) (h) and (j). The combined effect of these sections is to elevate 
the agreement between the parties on the qualifications to be possessed by any arbitrator 
appointee to the level of a condition (or fundamental term) of the contract between the 
arbitrator and the parties. It is important to highlight this provision of the LSAL since 
generally spealung a person does not need to possess any specific qualification 
(academic, professional or otherwise) to act as an arbitrator. There is no law in Nigeria 
(or particularly in Lagos state) to that effect so that such qualification will need to have 
been agreed by the parties before the appointment of the arbitrator. It appears that where 
the parties are silent as to the qualifications the arbitrator should possess, anybody can 
still be appointed arbitrator by the parties in Lagos state. 
The third ground is an interesting one referring to physical and mental capacity of the 
arbitrator. This can be a complex issue especially as the law does not provide any 
guidance but clearly implicates questions of fact. The alternative limb which is where 
there is justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator's physical or mental capacity may impact on 
some cultural issues. For example, at what point does 'justifiable doubt' as to a person's 
physical or mental capacity arise? How would such doubt be established? It is obvious 
that this provision will not minimise judicial interference but create opportunities for 
ingenious lawyers to delay the proceedings. Ground four compliments one of the 
general principles of the LSAL, to pursue the arbitration without unnecessary delay or 
expense.35 To assist the arbitrator (where some delay may be necessary) and forestall 
frivolous applications, the LSAL provides a safety net that such delay must cause the 
applicant substantial injustice. 
Where a party wishes to challenge the arbitrator, all disputing parties can agree the 
procedure to adopt and where they have not, the LSAL makes default provisions. The 
challenging party has fifteen days from the time he becomes aware of the circumstances 
substantiating the ground(s) for challenge to make the ~hallenge. '~ Fifteen days is an 
incredibly short time for a party to decide whether the information in its possession (1) 
is enough to substantiate a ground for challenge; and (2) whether to challenge or not. 
Several factors need to be taken into account simply because this is a challenge of the 
person (or one of those) who will decide the dispute. It is clear that the success or 
failure of the challenge will depend to a great extent on the validity and provability of 
the information or data relied upon in malung the challenge. The fact that avoiding 
unnecessary delay is one of the overriding objectives of the LSAL may be seen as a 
justification for this provision. 
The applicant will make the challenge in writing to the arbitral tribunal and send copies 
of this to the other parties in the dispute.j7 The reasons for the challenge must be 
contained in this written statement. The arbitral tribunal or the arbitral institution 
nominated as appointing authority will decide the challenge. The LSAL is silent on 
challenge under institutional arbitration, presumably because institutions usually 
'' See s 34 and s l (a)  LSAL. 
36 See s 11 LSAL and s 9 ACA which also provides for fifteen days. 
" In accordance with s 1 l(3) & (4) LSAL, the challenged arbitrator can withdraw or  where the other 
party agrees to the challenge, then he  would have to withdraw since this is a firm termination of  his 
mandate and contract for service. 
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provide for the decision maker in their arbitration rules.'"t is obvious that in a three 
member arbitral tribunal, where one arbitrator is challenged, the remaining two 
arbitrators should decide the challenge. The absence of the challenged arbitrator on the 
panel is on the basis of the fundamental legal principle that no man can be a judge in his 
own cause. But this conclusion is not obvious from section l l (5)  LSAL especially 
where there is no appointing authority. The applicant in that situation will request the 
Lagos High Court to make the d e c i ~ i o n . ~ ~ ~ h i s  is supported by section 12(2) LSAL 
which provides for the court to decide arbitral challenge where, 'the applicant has first 
exhausted any available recourse to that irzstitcitiorz or persotz' (emphasis added). This 
obviously refers to the appointing authority and not the arbitral tribunal itself. Where 
the parties have designated an appointing authority (whether arbitral institution or 
another) then clearly that authority will make the decision. The LSAL anticipates that 
the parties will nominate an appointing authority to exercise the powers allocated to it 
under the law,'and in default of such appointment, the Lagos Court of Arbitration will 
act. This analysis will also apply where the arbitral tribunal is constituted by a sole 
arbitrator. 
A different section deals with a disputing party's right to seek removal of an arbitrator 
before the court on slightly dissimilar grounds. Grounds 1, 3 and 4 are in the same terms. 
Ground 2 is where the arbitrator does not possess the qualification 'required by the 
arbitration It is submitted that 'agreed by the parties7 is wider than 
'required by the arbitration agreement'. Disputing parties can agree several issues 
(within their powers under the lex arbitri) after the dispute arises and arbitration 
commences. Such matters may not necessarily have been agreed in the arbitration 
agreement. For example, rarely will parties detail the academic (or professional) 
qualification to be possessed by the arbitrator in the arbitration agreement but can 
expressly or by implication agree this issue after commencing the reference while in the 
process of appointing the arbitrator. The direct effect of this change of words in section 
12 is to make subsection (1) (b) an additional ground for challenging an arbitrator 
before the courts. It must be noted that where parties provide for a particular 
qualification to be possessed by the arbitrator in the arbitration agreement and they 
subsequently change their minds (expressly, impliedly or by conduct) during the 
process of appointing the arbitrator, this will amount to an amendment .of the terms of 
the arbitration agreement which effectively means the new requirements as agreed 
between the parties supersedes the requirement expressed in the arbitration agreement. 
The LSAL clarifies that any pre-agreed arbitrator-challenge decision maker will have to 
make the decision before the applicant approaches the Lagos High ~ o u r t . ~ '  While the 
court proceeding is pending the arbitral tribunal can continue with the arbitral reference 
so that this is not frustrated by the challenge application. A new requirement in this 
regard is for the arbitrator (to be removed) to appear before the court to defend himself. 
3S In most institutions, the principal administrative organ of the institut~on will make such decisions. See 
for example art 15.1 the Lagos Regional Centre Arbitration Rules 2008 where the Centre (its Director 
General) makes the decision. 
39 This is on the basis of s 12 LSAL. 
40 Remember that s lO(3) (b) LSAL provides, 'the arbitrator does not possess the qualifications agreed by 
the parties'. 
41 See s 12(2) LSAL. Note that the ACA in s 9(2) mandates the arbitral tribunal to make the decision so 
that the discussion on the challenge of a sole arbitrator will also affect the ACA. 
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It is difficult to reconcile this 'right' given to the arbitrator with arbitral jurisprudence 
on this issue. Usually the court application will not be against the challenged arbitrator 
but filed against the other party to the dispute, though the allegations are made against 
the arbitrator. This new pro\/ision at first glance, appears to correct the 'anomaly' of 
getting the othel- party to the arbitration to 'answer' the allegation against the arbitrator. 
At best. this is a right given to the arbitrator In the LSAL which he will be at liberty to 
exercise at his discretion. However the provision leaves the door open t a party to 
request the cour-t to summon the arbitrator to answer to the allegations. This is not 
attractive especially because the arbitra~or is not party to the dispute and so should not 
descend into the arena of conflict. Moreover if the arbitrator feels strongly about the 
allegation agains: him before the court, slhe can always make representations to the 
court (as an interested third party). This is even without the statutory provision. In the 
event of the loss of one or more arbitrators, substitute arbitrators will be appointed.42 
Section 16 LSAL provides that where an arbitrator ceases to hold office (by challenge, 
termination, resignation or death), the parties can agree on the effect (if any) such 
cessation of office 'may have on any appointment made by the arbitrator (alone or 
jointly)'." On reading this section, one situation that immediately comes to mind is its 
effect on the appointment of the presiding arbitrator where in a panel of arbitrators, a 
successfully challenged co-arbitrator (for example) had joined in the appointment of the 
presiding arbitrator (who was not challenged). Section 16(2)(b) LSAL in answer, 
44 
expressly excludes this situation. Note however that the section refers to any 
appoi~ztrizerzt made by such arbitrator. This may therefore affect the appointment of the 
tribunal secretary where he or she was appointed by the challenged arbitrator or a 
tribunal appointed expert wi tne~s .~ '  This provision gives the section a wider effect than 
is recognised in arbitral law and practice. 
On the consequence of a truncated tribunal, section 16(2) LSAL provides that where the 
parties have not made any agreement (on the effect of the cessation of the office of the 
arbitrator), the arbitral tribunal shall be reconstituted and then decide whether to repeat 
or continue any prior hearings. Thus where the arbitral tribunal is truncated, the default 
provision is for a substitute arbitrator to be appointed. The parties can agree ~therwise.~ '  
It appears from reading sections 16 and 17 together that a truncated tribunal must be 
reconstituted in order for it to proceed with the reference unless the parties agree 
otherwise. It is important disputing parties are aware of this provision so they ensure 
they either choose arbitration rules that allow the truncated tribunal to proceed in its 
truncated form (if necessary) or make express provisions to this effect.47 
" Sees  17 LSAL and s I I ACA which refers to appointing a substitute arbitrator on the termination of 
the mandate of one of the arbitrators. 
47  See s 16 LSAL (emphasis added). Note that this section does not include removal of the arbitrator 
under s 13 LSAL. 
41 This recognises the theory that each arbitrator concludes a separate contract with the parties when he 
accepts appointment. So that if for whatever reason (successful challenge. termination. resignation or 
death) his contract comes to an end. this will only affect that particular arbitrator- and not the other 
members of the tribunal. See Emilia Onyema (2010) at pp 76-83. 
45 See Emilia Onyema. 'The Role of the International Arbitral Tribunal Secretary'. 9 VJ (2005) pp 99-1 10 
j6 See s 17 LSAL. 
47 See the wording of art 14 of the Arbitration Rules scheduled to the ACA. 
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2.3 Arbi tral process 
The disputing parties can agree when the arbitral reference will commence. In the 
absence of any agreement arbitral proceedings will be deemed to commence on the date 
the request for arbitration is delivered to the respondent party.4"arties must keep a 
record of the delivery date along with evidence of effective service or- delivery. This is 
especially important as being the deemed date of commencement of the arbitral 
reference, this date will affect limitation periods for commencing an action. 
The LSAL empowers the arbitrator to determine his jurisdiction including the existence 
or validity of the arbitration agreement.49 1t is trite that the power of the arbitrator 
emanates from the arbitration agreement. Practically every modem law on arbitration 
expressly empowers the arbitrator. to determine his jurisdiction which includes the 
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement (doctrine of competence- 
competence). 50 
The LSAL also clarifies the period in the arbitrai' reference when a party can raise the 
issue of challenge to the jurisdiction of the t r i b ~ n a l . ~ '  It is important to note that where 
this objection is not raised in a timely manner, the arbitral tribunal can, 'admit a later 
plea if it considers that the delay is j ~ s t i f i e d ' . ~ ~  A party contesting the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal can raise the challenge at any time prior to submitting the points of 
dispute. The choice of the words 'points of dispute' in this section may be confusing. It 
is suggested that where a list of issues in dispute are contained in the Points of Claim 
and served along with the request for arbitration, the respondent must be careful not to 
respond to the points of Claim as such response may amount to 'taking steps in the 
proceedings' such as to lead to the loss of the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the 
5 3 arbitrator. The decision of the arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction is 'final and 
binding'. 54 The arbitral tribunal can make this decision on its jurisdiction in a 
preliminary award or in the final award on the merits. The final award is subject to 
challenge before the Lagos High Court on grounds that impact on its jurisdiction as 
examined below. 
The LSAL helpfully makes express provision on the language of the tribunal. The 
official language of Nigeria (and of Lagos State) is English and most commercial 
contracts connected to the State will be written in the English language. Note that 
parties arbitrating under the LSAL may wish their arbitral reference to be conducted in 
another language and are empowered to agree on this.55 
48 See s 32 LSAL. Note that s 17 ACA uses the more definite phrase. 'received by the other party'. 
" See s 19(1) LSAL and s 12(1) ACA. 
See s 12 ACA and note that s 19(2) LSAL further clarifies the application of the doctrine of separability 
and its effects on the arbitral reference. For more details on these doctrines, see Emilia Onyema, 'The 
Doctrine of Separability under Nigerian Law', AJBPCL (2009) pp 65-79. 
5 '  See s 19(3) LSAL and s 12(3) ACA. 
52 See s 19(3) (b) LSAL and s 12(3) of ACA. 
53 See ss 17-18 LSAL and s 19 ACA on Points of Claim and Points of Defence. 
jJ See s 19(4) LSAL and s 12(4) ACA. 
'' S 36 LSAL and see the more elaborate provision of s 18 ACA. 
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The claimant is required to serve a 'Point of Claim' on the respondent who in return 
serves his 'Point of Defence' on the c~aimant .~" These pleadings should stale the facts 
relied upon to support the claim (defence or counterclaim), points in issue, relief or 
5 7 
remedy sought and any additional relevant partic~llars as appropriate. It is the 
responsibility of each party to ensure that whatever documents i t  serves on the arbitral 
tribunal, the same is served on the other Where the document emanates from the 
arbitral tribunal then the onus is on the tribunal to ensure that all the parties are served.") 
In the absence of agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the place 
of arbitration, the date (reference to hearing dates), and time (for taking various steps in 
the proceeding)."0 In arbitral practice, the arbitrator will agree these and other relevant 
administrative issues with the parties at the preliminary meeting or hearing. The agreed 
terms from such meeting are contained in a preliminary order or notice. This order or 
notice guides all parties as to the conduct of the arbitration. It is important to note that 
this provision does not refer to the juridical seat of arbitration6' but to the place or venue ' 
agreed for the hearing or for any other activity of the arbitral tribunal, clarifying the 
domestic remit of the LSAL. An imnortant safeguard that the arbitral tribunal is not 
bound to meet at the agreed venue and can conduct its activities in other places is also 
provided. This is particularly important in a Federation where each constituent State 
may have its own law on arbitration and ensures adequate flexibility for the arbitral 
tribunal to be guided by the location of the witnesses, evidence and convenience of the 
parties.62 
The LSAL gives the arbitral tribunal wide powers over the arbitral process but these can 
63 be limited by the parties. These include the tribunal's power to order the payment of a 
sum of money in any currency, order a party to do or refrain from doing anythir~g,~" 
order specific performance of a c ~ n t r a c t , ~ ~ a n d  order the rectification. setting aside or 
. cancellation of any deed or other document.66 For- the effective conduct of the arbitral 
proceeding, the tribunal can also administer oaths or take affirmations of the parties and 
witnesses appearing before it, determine whether and when to hold oral hearings or 
proceed by documents only or combination of both, and determine the admissibility. 
relevance, materiality and weight to be attached to any evidence presented before it.67 In 
addition, the tribunal can dismiss the arbitral claim in certain circumstances. These are 
where there has been 'inordinate and inexcusable delay' by the claimant in pursuing the 
56 These documents are also served on the arbitral tribunal in adequate copies for each arbitrator and 
possibly a tribunal secretary. 
'7 See s 37 LSAL and s 56 ACA. 
5s See for example s 39(3) LSAL. 
50 See s 39(3)(4) LSAL and the parties should be served at the same time. See also s 20 ACA. 
"Sees  33 LSAL. 
61 On the basis of s 2 LSAL this will be Lagos State. 
61 See s 33(2) LSAL. This in effect protects an arbitral reference with seat in Lagos state but hearing in 
Abeokuta (Ogun State) for example. The fact that the place of hearing is in another State will not affect 
the application of the LSAL or the jurisdiction of the Lagos High Court over the reference. 
63 See s 38( l )  and s 38(2) (a) LSAL. 
6.4 The act ordered must comply with Nigerian laui and publ~c polrc!,. 
65 Note that though the LSAL applies to an arbitration agreement pursuant to a legal relationship 'whether 
contractual or not' according to s X I ) .  the power to order specific performance is limited to contracts. 
""ee s 38(2) LSAL. 
07 See s 39 and s 3 1 LSAL. Arbitrators enjoy the same powers undu the ACA. 
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claim. Such delay however must in addition, give rise or be likely to give rise to, 'a 
substantial risk that a fair resolution of the issues . . . will not be possible', or has caused 
or will cause 'serious prejudice' to the respondent.68 The tribunal also has powers to 
award simple or compound interest on any sum, from such dates and at such rates the 
tribunal considers j u ~ t . ~ ~ ~ i n c e  the parties may withdraw any of these powers from the 
tribunal i t  is important they are aware of the endowment and make an informed choice 
of whether to opt out of these provisions.70 
Each disputing party has a protected nght to be heard. This right includes being given 
the opportunity to present its case and defend the allegations against it.7' The LSAL 
makes various express provisions to ensure the observance of this fundamental right. An 
example is in section 34 which requires the tribunal to treat the parties equally. It is each 
party's responsibility to ensure it attends and is represented at any scheduled hearing of 
which it has been notified and present any written evidence as required. Where a party 
fails to attend or present evidence, the tribunal may continue with the proceedings and 
make an award.'- The award (like any award) would be on the basis of the evidence 
before the tribunal. This provision emphasizes the very importance of a party putting 
not just its claim but evidence to prove its claims or assertions before the tribunal. It is 
not for the tribunal to second guess or manufacture evidence for any of the parties. The 
tribunal is expressly empowered to appoint expert witnesses with wide powers on the 
remit of these witnesses. The right of the parties to cross examine the witnesses in oral 
hearing is also protected.73 
In addition the arbitral tribunal has to ensure a fair resolution of the dispute without 
unnecessary delay or expense.74 Thus the arbitral tribunal must actively seek to avoid 
unnecessary delay and at the same time ensure the parties are heard and given a fair 
opportunity to present their case (and respond to the case against them). Bofh 
obligations are important and are geared towards ensuring fair hearing and safeguarding 
due process. There may be tension complying with both obligations, for example where 
a party repeatedly seeks extension of time from the arbitral tribunal, should the request 
be granted even where the tribunal forms the view that the application is an unnecessary 
delay of the proceeding. In practice, most arbitrators in protection of the enforcement of 
their award will opt to allow the fair hearing obligation ovemde the 'avoid unnecessary 
delay' obligation. This is fair enough but the additional obligation to avoid unnecessary 
expense may be more difficult for the arbitral tribunal to police. 1t .k suggested that 
expense in this section should refer to those items that make up the cost of the 
arbitration as listed in the L S A L . ~ ~  Included in the lists are items such as, cost of legal 
representation, fees and travel expenses of parties and their witnesses. It is obvious that 
the arbitral tribunal would lack any control over these items. All the arbitral tribunal can 
" See s 4 l(3) LSAL. 
69 See s 46 LSAL. 
70 The arbitrator does not enjoy a comparable power under the ACA. 
7' See s 34 LSAL and s 14 ACA. 
7' See s 41(4) LSAL but note that such failure should not prejudice the party. 
73 See s 42 LSAL and s 22(1) & (2) ACA. 
74 See s 34 LSAL. Under s 14 ACA the arbitrator is only required to treat the parties equally and grant 
them a full opportunity to present their case. There is no obligation to avoid undue delay. 
75 As listed under s 5 l(1) LSAL to include fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal, travel and other 
expenses of the parties. witnesses and experts, cost of legal representation and administrative cost. 
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do is where such costs are sought to be recovered. to only award sums that are 
reasonable. 
To give teeth to the powers of the tribunal over the arbitral proceeding, the LSAL 
empowers the tribunal to make a peremptory order in terms of any order or direction 
previously made but not complied with by a party.76 Where the party also fails to 
comply with the peremptory order the tribunal may direct such party not to rely on any 
material or allegation, the subject matter of the order; draw such adverse inference as 
the circumstance justify; base its award only on materials properly produced before it; 
and make relevant orders as to cost against the defaulting party.77 This is a very 
important section as it gives the arbitral tribunal additional powers to assist it in its 
obligation of ensuring a fair resolution of the dispute without unnecessary delay and 
expense. 78 
On decision making by the tribunal, the LSAL empowers the parties (or co-arbitrators) 
to authorise the presiding arbitrator to decide procedural issues. This is an exception to 
the provision that any decision must be by a majority of the tribuna~.~? Thls.o-f, course 
only applies where the arbitra! tribuna! is composed of more than one arbitrator. The 
arbitral award however must be made by a majority and a reason as to the absence of 
the signature of the dissenting arbitrator will suffice." After delivering the award to the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to c ~ r r e c t , ~ '  interprets2 and make additional 
a ~ a r d , ~ ~ a t  the request of one of the parties within clearly defined time periods.84 
Parties can settle their dispute even after they have commenced arbitration under the 
LSAL. However the LSAL does not require arbitrators to actively encourage the parties 
to settle. The generally accepted practice is that disputing parties can reach a settlement 
of their dispute at any time before the arbitral tribunal publishes its final award. 
However section 45 LSAL limits this right to 'during the arbitral This 
may imply that once proceedings are concluded, parties are precluded from reaching a 
settlement. The pro-ADR atmosphere currently pervading dispute resolution in Nigeria 
makes such a conclusion doubtful. The limitation in section 45 however creates the 
need to define when the arbitral proceedings come to a close since it,raises the question 
whether, in the period between the closure of arbitral hearings and publication of the 
award by the arbitral tribunal the parties can enter into a settlement over their dispute. 
This is especially important if the parties wish for their settlement terms to be 
76 The  ACA does not contain such a provision. 
77 See  s 4 l (7)  LSAL. 
78 In accordance with s l(a) LSAL. 
79 See s 44 LSAL and note that the disputing parties can agree otherwise. This means that the parties can 
insist on a unanimous decision for example. Note that s 24 ACA makes provisions to the same effect. 
80 See s 47(2) LSAL. 
81 See  s 50(1) (a) LSAL to correct computational, clerical, typographical o r  similar errors in the award. 
This correction can also be made by the arbitral tribunal on its own volition in accordance with s 50(1)  (3) 
L S  AL. 
82 See  s 50(1) (b) LSAL to interpret a specific point 01- part of the award. 
83 See s 50(4) LSAL and should be on claims made in the arbitral reference but omitted from the award. 
&t Note that the parties can agree different time periods for the exercise of these powers while the arbitral 
tribunal can extend the time within which i t  will make the correction. interpretation or  additional award in 
accordance with s 50(6) LSAL. 
85 See  s 25 ACA to the same effect. 
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formulated into a consent award by the arbitral tribunal. It appears that section 45(1) 
will have to be given a wide interpretation to accommodate such scenario. This is 
especially so as the LSAL itself is geared towards parties obtaining a fair resolution of 
their dispute without unnecessary delay and expense. Surely a mutually agreed 
settlement will satisfy this objective. Some assistance with interpreting this provision 
can be gleaned from section 48(1) LSAL which alludes to arbitral proceedings 
terminating when the final award is made. It is suggested that in line with the reasoning 
above and this section, 'during the arbitral proceeding' will be from commencement of 
the arbitral reference to the time the final award is made. Such time will be the date on 
the said award. This interpretation will ensure the disputing parties can settle their 
dispute and request the arbitral tribunal to enter the terms of settlement in a consent 
award any time from commencement of the arbitration until the tribunal notifies the 
parties of the final award on the merits of the dispute. The tribunal can transcribe the 
agreed settlement into a consent award (or award on agreed terms) when so requested 
by the parties.86 
The discussions above show that there are some changes between the provisions of the 
ACA and LSAL which bring greater clarification on the arbitral procedure. The most 
notable addition is the power given to the arbitrator to make peremptory orders in the 
LSAL. 
2.4 Award and grounds for setting it aside 
An arbitral award made under the provisions of the LSAL must satisfy certain formal 
requirements. Such awards to be forrnaily valid must be in writing and duly signed by 
the arbitrators." In addition to the formal validity requirements, the award must satisfy 
certain substantive validity  requirement^.^' These are that the reasons on which the 
decision was based are stated in the award, except the parties had dispensed with the 
award being reasoned, or it is a consent award; and the date and place where the award 
was made are also stated in it.89 
Immediately the arbitral award is made, it shall be delivered (or published) to the 
disputing parties.90 The LSAL does not expressly state who should notify the disputing 
parties of this fact. This may be to accommodate situations where the arbitral tribunal or 
its secretary, or arbitration institution so notifies the parties. A technical interpretation 
of the section implies that notification of the award is not the sole responsibility of the 
arbitral tribunal, thus creating some degree of uncertainty. However it can also be said 
to be a matter of arbitral practice that in ad hoc arbitration, the notification will be done 
86 The parties will still be bound to pay the fees of the arbitrator for time spent on drafting an award, for 
example. 
87 Note that where the award is by majority decision, the dissenting arbitrator may refuse to sign the 
award. As already noted this will not invalidate the award as long as  the reason for the absent signature is 
stated on the face of the award as provided in s 47(3) (a) LSAL. See  also s 26(2) ACA to the same effect. 
88 See s 47(3) LSAL and s 26 ACA. 
89 Note that the deemed place of  the award is the place agreed by the parties or determined by the tribunal 
In accordance with s 47(3) (c) LSAL. 
90 See s 49(1) LSAL. There is no similar provision in the ACA. This is understandable since pursuing the 
reference w~thout  undue delay is not a requirement under the ACA. 
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by the arbitral tribunal or its secretary while under institutional references, the 
institution will notify the parties.9' 
Each party is entitled to receive one copy of the award. There appears to be nothing in 
the LSAL to prevent a party from demanding more than one copy of the signed award 
from the arbitral tribunal. However the tribunal may be minded to publish one copy to 
each of the parties and additional copies requested will be certified true copies which 
the tribunal will certify." It is important to note that the LSAL does not require the 
arbitral tribunal to file or deposit a copy of the award with any other authority (for 
example the court) or body. It appears the LSAL envisages a two-stage process for 
collection of the award. The first stage is for the notifying entity to serve a notice in 
writing on the parties informing them that the award is ready for collection followed by 
the delivery of the award to the parties.93 The notification stage is couched in mandatory 
terms so that where for example in an ad hoc reference, the arbitrator has written up his 
award, it is insufficient for him to send (by post, electronic mail or any other means) the 
award to the parties without first serving a notice on them.94 It is not clear from the 
LSAL the consequence of such a failure by the arbitral tribunal (or institution). It is 
difficult to appreciate the relevance of this requirement of notice and of making it 
mandatory. However note that there is nothing in the LSAL that stops the arbitral 
tribunal sending the notice of readiness of the award and the award at the same time to 
the parties. Even though the LSAL expressly empowers the arbitrator to refuse to 
deliver up the award to the parties except on full payment of his fees and expensesY5 
note that the arbitrator will still be required to notify the parties of the readiness of the 
award since the two obligations are independent of each other. 
It is trite that upon delivery of the final award and full payment of his fees and 
refundable expenses, the arbitrator becomes functus officio as his mandate effectively 
comes to an end. Jurisdiction over the arbitral reference transfers back to the disputing 
parties. It is for the party against whom the award has been made to voluntarily perform 
the award. Where the award is not so performed, either party can seek the assistance of 
the courts to set aside or enforce the award. The LSAL gives the party wishing to set 
aside the award three months from the date of the award (or additional award) to request 
the Lagos High Court to set aside the award.96 It is important to note that the court has 
discretion on whether or not to set aside the award.97 So effectively, even where one of 
the grounds on which the LSAL provides for an award to be set aside is proved, it is for 
the court to determine that it is of a standard to merit the setting aside of the award. 
Section 55(3) LSAL expressly states that in addition to proving the ground relied on, it  
must cause or have caused the applicant substantial injusticem9* 
91 This can be inferred from s 49(7) LSAL which expressly refers to the institution delivering the award. 
92 See s 47(4) LSAL. 
The notification must be by written notice and so can conceivably be by electronic mail, letter, text 
message, fax, telex but not by telephone. The ACA in s 26(4) simply provides for delivery of the award to 
each party. 
ar Note that nothing stops the arbitral tribunal sending both the notice and award at the same time through 
the same medium. 
95 See s 49(2) LSAL which is at the discretion of the arbitrator. 
% See s 55(1) LSAL and s 29 ACA. 
97 The provision of s 55(2)  LSAL opens with 'The Court rnay . . .' (emphasis added). 
'' Note that the ACA does not contain this safeguard which is inspired by s 68 EAA. 
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The Lagos High Court can make one of three orders in this connection: i t  can remit the 
award back to the tribunal in whole or in part; set the award aside in whole or in part; 
and render the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part.99 This generally raises the 
question of the difference between setting aside an award and rendering the award of no 
effect.''' It is clear that an award that has been set aside in whole has no legal effect and 
where a part or parts of i t  are set aside then those parts are of no legal effect and so 
unenforceable.lO' It appears that where the award can be remitted back to the tribunal, 
then that would be the preferred option to setting the award aside or declaring it of no 
effect. lo' 
Before examining the grounds on which an award may be set aside under the LSAL, it 
must be noted that some of the grounds are similar to those listed under the ACA."' 
The grounds can also be categorised into those arising under the arbitration agreement, 
the arbitrators, the arbitral process, and under public policy. 
Grounds arising under arbitration agreement 
The award can be set aside where one of the parties to the arbitration agreement is under 
some incapacity. lo4 This refers to legal capacity as a fundamental issue of formal 
validity of the arbitration agreement itself. The effect of this ground is that basically the 
arbitration agreement was fundamentally flawed and so null and void and of no legal 
effect. An example of such a scenario is where for example under section 54 of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) one of the parties is not an entity duly 
registered under CAMA to carry on business in Nigeria. 
Another ground deals with other validity requirements for the arbitration agreement 
under the law chosen by the parties or under Nigerian l a ~ . ' ~ % i s  provision includes 
any matter that will invalidate or vitiate a contract under the chosen or Nigerian law. It 
has been mentioned above that the reference or allusion to foreign law in this section is 
misconceived. The third ground that impacts on the arbitration agreement is where the 
award deals with a dispute not contemplated or within the arbitration agreement or 
matters beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.'06 To appreciate the possible 
problems with interpretation that may arise by the separation of these two provisions it 
is important to define the keywords italicised above. According to Black's Law 
Dictionary, 'dispute' refers to 'a conflict of claims or rights, the matter fbr which a suit 
107 is brought and upon which issue is,joined.. . , while 'matter' is defined as 'substantial 
" See s 55(3) LSAL. 
100 Under the ACA, the court can set aside the award or remit it back to the tribunal, in either case. in 
whole or in part. 
101 See Black's Lnw Dictiortar?. on definition of set aside as 'to reverse, vacate, cancel, annul. or revoke a 
judgment, order, etc', while no effect refers to not enforceable. not executable. See p 1372 and p 5 14 
respective1 y . 
I0'See s 55(4) LSAL. 
'O-ee ss 29-30 ACA. 
I w  See s 55(2) (i) LSAL. 
I0"ee s 55(2) (ii) LSAL. 
106 See s 55(2) (iv) & (v) LSAI. 1 1  is suggested that making separate provisions on dispute and n~cctters 
not falling within the arbitration agreement may create confusion and uncertainty as to whether the issue 
complained about is a dispute 01 matter. This sort of confusion is avoidable. 
107 Black's Law Dictionary. 6"' ed~t~on .  West. 1990. p 472. 
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- 10s facts forming basis of claim or defense, facts material to an issue ... . Therefore i t  is 
suggested that the first de fa~~ l t  implies such dispute was not before the tribunal while in 
the second case the tribunal considered facts not put before it. In either case, i t  is a 
question of lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal conferred under the arbitration 
agreement but the results will be different. If the complaint falls under matter, and the 
matters are separable then those matters that fall within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement, will be upheld while those matters that fall outside i t  will be set aside. This 
implies a partial setting aside of the award. However if the complaint falls under dispute 
then the whole award will be set aside. Clearly the consequences of identifying whether 
the issue complained about is a matter or dispute can be grave. If as suggested above 
both imply a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitral tribunal, i t  may have been 
better to leave the nature of the order to be made to the discretion of the court, so that 
where the issue can be separated from the rest of the award, then a partial setting aside 
order will be made. This can still be the practical interpretation of both sections. 
There is a ground under section 55(2) (viii) LSAL which refers to the invalidity of the 
agreement under which the dispute arose. It appears this is a reference to the substantive 
contract. So where the award validates or upholds a contract (not being the arbitration 
agreement) which the Court determines to be invalid, non-existent or ineffective, such 
award may be set aside. This reference must be to the substantive contract since the 
validity of the arbitration agreement has been provided for under section 55(2)(ii). In 
interpreting and applying this section, the Court will need to be careful so as not to 
review the award on its merit thereby translating a setting aside application to a full 
appeal. 
Grounds that affect the arbitrators 
Another ground on which the arbitral award may be set aside is where the composition 
of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.'09 The 
agreemen't of the parties is here limited by any relevant mandatory provision of the 
LSAL. A reference back to section 7 reveals that the number of arbitrators is not treated 
as a mandatory matter. It will be recalled that this section empowers the disputing 
parties to determine the number of arbitrators. The section even permits the parties to 
choose an even numbered t r i buna~ . ' ' ~  It is important to note that this ground will fall 
within the waiver provision in section 58. This being the case, i t  appears that a breach of 
this ground will only occur where the applicant was not aware of the formation of the 
arbitral tribunal, which will also amount to a breach of the due process provision 
examined below. 
The remaining grounds that directly affect the arbitrator are corruption of the 
arbitrator"' and lack of qualification required under the arbitration agreement."2~t is 
suggested that these additional two grounds will also amount to clear breaches of the 
Io8 Black's Law Dictionary. 6'" edition, West, 1990, p 978 
109 See s 55(2)  (vi) LSAL. 
l l o  See s 7(2) LSAL. 
I l l  See s 55(2) (x)  LSAI- 
' I 2  See s 55(2) (xi) LSAI.. 
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I I.? arbitration agreement. This is moreso since the subsection expressly refers to 
qualification agreed in the arbitration agreement. The third additional ground is on any 
I I4 
misconduct of the arbitrator in the course of the proceedings. This is a very wide 
provision implicating technical, procedural and substantive misconduct and again most 
of the matters listed under these types of misconduct of the arbitrator in case law can 
115 conveniently be subsumed under some of the previous grounds. The cumulative 
effect of the misconduct ground is that the grounds in the section are not exclusive but 
quite open ended.lI6 This is does not conform with the overriding objectives of the 
LSAL in section 1 and the misconduct ground should not have been included but buried 
for good by the Lagos State legislator. 
Grounds arising from the arbitral process 
As it relates to the conduct of the arbitral process itself, there are two grounds breach of 
which will make the award liable to be set aside. These are: lack of observance of due 
process and conducting the arbitration contrary to the agreement of the parties. The 
parties' fundamental right to be heard is protected in the form of each party being 
properly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator, the arbitral proceedings, and of 
being given a fair opportunity to present his case and answer the case against hirn.'I7 
This in effect preserves each party's right to natural justice or due process. The second 
ground that impacts on the arbitral process is where the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties.1'8~ote however, that it is possible for a 
party to waive these rights if the party failed to raise any objection during the 
pr~ceeding."~ 1n this way the LSAL tries to prevent tactical positioning by parties 
where they spot lapses with the arbitral proceeding but sit it out with the intention to 
challenge the arbitral award on such grounds if they lose the arbitration. Parties must be 
aware of this possibility to tacitly consent to an irregularity so that they exercise their 
right to raise an objection once they become aware of such irregularity or reserve their 
right to challenge the award on that ground. 
The remaining two grounds impact on public policy considerations and are on objective 
arbitrability and public policy. Note that the subject matter of the dispute must be 
capable of settlement under the laws of Nigeria.I2O This is self explanatory since it is not 
disputes arising from all subject matters that can be arbitrated under the laws of Nigeria. 
On the compliance of the award with public policy, it is suggested that this refers to the 
113 Where the parties were deceived by the arbitrator into thinking he has the required qualification, the 
arbitrator's appointment will not be in accordance with the agreement of the parties. This will also be a 
question of misconduct. However where the parties were aware of this lack of qualification but continued 
with the proceeding, then they will be deemed to have consented to this and have waived their right to 
complain. 
See s 55(2) (xii) LSAL and s 30 ACA. 
l I5 See for example J.O. Orojo and M.A. Ajomo, h n ,  and Practice of Arbitratiorl and Conciliatio~~ iri 
Nigeria, Mbeyi & Associates Publ. 1999. pp 275-286. 
116 It is debatable if this is desirable under the LSAL especially since it  sacrifices certainty and modernity 
to adhere to some aspects of the Common law such as misconduct of the arbitrator. 
See s 55(2) (iii) LSAL. 
118 See s 55(2) (vi) LSAL. Note that the procedure agreed by the parties must not contravene a mandatory 
requirement of this law. 
119 See s 58 LSAL. 
See s 55(2) (ix) LSAL. 
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public policy of Nigeria which is ascertained through its statutory laws and decisions of 
the courts. I" 
Enforcement of the award 
An arbitral award made in Lagos 01- any other state of the Federation will be recognised 
as binding and be enforced by the Lagos High Court on application of a party bound by 
the award.I2' It is important to note that the arbitral award becomes binding on the 
parties when it is made by the arbitral tribunal. The Lagos High Court will recognise its 
binding nature. In an arbitral award, one party will most likely be ordered to do or 
refrain from doing something and in majority of cases one party will be ordered to pay a 
sum in money to the other party. Any party involved in arbitration does not just want to 
get a favourable award but wants the tangible effect of the award so for example if the 
award was for a money sum, the party wants to receive the funds awarded to it. This can 
be achieved in various ways. The party against whom the aw.ard was made. can 
voluntarily pay the award sum.123 However, the world is not ideal so that in some cases, 
the party against whom the award was made will fail or refuse to comply with the terms 
of the award. The onus will then shift unto the party in whose favour the award was 
made to take steps to enforce the award.124 To do this, the LSAL requires the applicant 
to seek enforcement of the award before the Lagos High Court. The conditions to fulfil 
are that the application must be in writing (so possibly through an originating 
summons/writ). In support of the application the applicant must produce the 
authenticated copy of the original award or a certified true copy of same, the original 
copy of the arbitration agreement or a certified true copy of same and pay necessary 
court fees.12' Under the LSAL, the award can be enforced in the same manner as a 
judgment of the Lagos High ~ 0 u r t . l ~ ~  
The judgment debtor or losing party in the award can, either actively commence an 
action resisting the award before the Lagos High Court, or wait for the winning party to 
seek recognition and enforcement of the award and then resist that action.'27 The Court 
will refuse to recognise and enforce the award on similar grounds as those on which i t  
will set aside the award.12' The first thing to note is that there is no time limit indicated 
129 for applications brought under this section. On the grounds, the second part of section 
57(2) (b) extends beyond that of subsection 55(2)(ii) to '... Arbitration Agreement is 
I" See s 55(2) (xiii) LSAL. 
"' This application shall be by Originating Motion in accordance with rule 7 of the Arbitration 
Application Rules 2009 scheduled to LSAL. 
123 It is assumed that most awards are voluntarily complied with. This can only be an assumption because 
of the private nature of the process since knowledge of the exact numbers of references is not empirically 
known. 
I24 Note that the enforcement application is subject to the applicant producing the relevant documents and 
s 58 LSAL on waiver. 
125 See s 56(2) LSAL and note that if the award 01- arbitration agreement is not in the English language 
(being the language of the Lagos High Court), these will have to be translated into English for purposes 
of the application. See also s 31 ACA. 
126 See s 56(3) LSAL. Note that leave of the Court is required and this implies that the applicant can rely 
on the enforcement mechanism of the Lagos High Court. 
127 See s 57 LSAL. 
126 The similarity is only on s 55(2) (i), ( i i )  & ( i i i )  LSAL. 
129 In contrast to s 55 LSAL as this section requires three months from the date of the award for setting 
aside applications. 
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not valid under the Law; of the Country where the award was made'. As already argued, 
it  is very doubtful any award made outside Nigeria sought to be enforced within Lagos 
State will be subject to the LSAL. Such an award will fall within Part III of the ACA or 
be enforced under the New Yor-k Convention pursuant to section 54 ACA. This 
therefore means that the section 57(3) (b) LSAL quoted above has no legal effect. 
2.5 Termination of arbitral proceedings 
The tribunal can terminate the arbitral proceeding where a claimant fails to file a Point 
130 of Claim and the respondent does not file a counterclaim. Where the tribunal is 
satisfied that the claimant has delayed the proceeding and the delay will give rise to 
substantial risk that a fair resolution will be-achieved, the tribunal may dismiss the 
claim."'~therwise the arbitral proceeding terminates when the final award is 
As mentioned above this may be the date of the award and so will by necessity precede 
the delivery of the award to the parties. Another date will be that of delivery or 
publicatiui~. of the. award to ,the. parties. However such a date may be difficult to 
ascertain while the date on which the award is made is more certain.13' 
The tribunal can also terminate the arbitral proceeding through the issuance of an order. 
Such order will be issued where: the parties agree, the tribunal finds continuation of the 
proceeding unnecessary or impossible, or the claimant withdraws its claim but the 
respondent wishes to obtain a final settlement to the dispute. If the tribunal considers 
that the respondent has a legitimate interest, it shall issue an order terminating the 
134 arbitral proceeding. The direct consequence of the termination of the arbitration 
proceeding is the determination of the mandate of the a - b i t r a t ~ r . ' ~ ~  
The arbitrator's primary right and benefit of participating in the arbitral reference is 
payment for his services.i36 This comprises his fees and refundable  expense^.'"^ The 
LSAL in recognition of this right empowers the arbitrator to agree fees with the 
disputing parties and refuse to deliver up the award until paid."' Note however, that it is 
the obligation of the arbitral tribunal to fix the fees of the arbitrator and other cost of the 
1 30 See s 41(l)  (a) LSAL. Note that according to s 41(1), (b) & (c), where the respondent fails to file a 
defence to the claim, the tribunal shall continue with the proceeding. However where any party fails to 
appear at the hearing or produce documentary evidence. the tribunal will have a discretion on whether or 
not to continue with the proceeding. See also s 7-1 ACA for comparable provisions. 
1 3 '  See s 4 l(3) LSAL. 
. 
'" Note that termination does not depend on the publication of the award to the parties. 
133 The difficulty lies in determining the exact date of delivery or when delivery was actually made. A 
very simple example is where the tribunal sends the award by post to the parties and they each receive the 
award on different dates. Therefore on which of the dates will the award be said to be delivered? This also 
raises the issue of when exactly delivery is made. So for example is i t  when the award was posted or 
when it  was received? How do you prove date of receipt of the award? So to avoid these uncertainties, the 
date on the award is preferable. 
I" See s 48(2) LSAL. 
135 See s 49(1) LSAL and this affects each individual arbitrator since the mandate is personal to each 
arbitrator. See also s 27(3) ACA but note the scenarios in s lO(1) ACA on termination of the mandate of 
the arbitrator. 
See s 5 l(2) LSAL. 
'''See s 51( l )  (a) - (c) LSAL. 
13' See s 49(2) LSAL. 
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1-30 arbitration. Where the fees are not agreed (or the parties contest the fees) the Lagos 
High Court on the request of a party (on notice to the other parties and the arbitrator) 
can determine the fees payable to the a rb i t r a t~ r .~ '  1t is important to note that arbitration 
141 institutions enjoy these same rights with regards to their fees. Finally the arbitral 
tribunal can request a deposit towards the costs of the arbitration from the disputing 
parties from commencement of the reference.'" The fees payable to the arbitrators are 
expressly recognised under the LSAL as the primary responsibility of the disputing 
parties joinrly and severally.'43 It is--suggested that this also extends to the fees payable 
to arbitration institutions in accordance with the spirit of the law as discussed above.la 
3. Novel Provisions in the LSAL 
This section briefly examines the provisions-on some issues for which no provision is 
made in the ACA and which in that sense are novel provisions in legislations on 
arbitration in Nigeria. These are the choice of substantive law (3.1), consolidation and 
joinder (3.2), immunity of the arbitrator (3.3) and interim measures (3.4)'45. 
3.1 Choice of substantive law 
The disputing parties can choose the law or rules of law that they wish to apply to the 
determination of the substantive issues in dispute between them.'46 However, where the 
tribunal determines that the chosen rule of law is inappropriate or inadequate to deal 
with the substantive issues, even though expressly chosen by the parties such rules of 
law will not be applied. In effect to apply, the choice of the parties must be an effective 
one. In the absence of any choice (or where an inadequate choice was made) the arbitral 
tribunal will apply 'the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers 
appli~able'. '~' Note however that this formulation restricts the arbitral tribunal to the 
application of a law and not rules of law.I4' Therefore with an effective choice, parties 
have wider scope but not where the tribunal determines the applicable law. This 
provision expands the choice parties can make to include rules of law. Note that the 
reference to conflict of law test is an internal conflict. This is where the transaction 
implicates the application of the laws of more than one state of the federation. It does 
not implicate the laws of a foreign country which will make the transaction international 
'39 See s 51(1) LSAL and these costs include the fees and related expenses of each arbitrator, cost of 
experband other tribunal assistance (such as tribunal secretary, transcribers and stenographer), travel and 
other expense of the parties and their witnesses, claimed reasonable legal costs of the successful party, 
and administrative costs. 
I4O See s 49(3) LSAL in relation to the arbitrator withholding the award for lack of payment of his fees 
and expenses which should also apply even where the arbitrator does not exercise his right to withholding 
the award. 
14' See s 49(7) LSAL. 
142 See s 52 LSAL and note that this should also apply to arbitration institutions and supplementary 
deposits can be requested at various stages of the reference. 
143 See s 54 LSAL. 
144 The ACA makes provisions on cost in s 49 for international arbitration and arts 38-40 of the scheduled 
Arbitration Rules. 
145 The ACA makes a basic and very general provision on interim measures. 
146 See s 20 LSAL. Note that the reference in s 20(2) to a given jurisdiction or territory and its conflict of 
laws rules, as argued above are ineffective if they refer to another sovereign state. 
14' See s 20(3) LSAL. 
148 The issue on whether this provision is relevant considering that the LSAL jurisdiction is over domestic 
arbitration is discussed above. 
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and so outside the scope of the LSAL as argued above. There is a fill-ther obligation on 
the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute in justice and in good faith.'") The tribunal is 
also obligated to decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and take account of 
any applicable trade  usage^."^' 
3.2 Consolidation of disputes and joinder of parties 
These are new issues. The disputing pal-ties can agree the consolidation of the arbitral 
reference with other arbitral proceedings and the terms of any concurrent hearings. 15 I 
The impressive aspect of this provision is the fact that parties do not have to agree on 
these issues in their arbitration agreement but as the need arises during the arbitral 
reference. It is important to note the caveat giving the arbitral tribunal the power to 
strike down such agreement of the parties where the tribunal is of the view that it is not 
in the interest of justice to so order."%urther, the law makes provision for third party 
joinder. All that the third party (so non-party to the arbitration agreement) need do is 
make an application f a r  joinder to the arbitral tribunal with the consent of'the disputing 
This requirement of consent of the disputing parties preserves the contractual 
nature of the arbitration process since as a question of privity, the parties to the 
arbitration agreement need to give their consent to any consolidation or joinder request. 
However i t  is worrying that the right is bestowed on the third party and not on the 
parties directly, and without any condition such as the reference affecting the rights of 
the third party. The section also leaves open the question whether a disputing party can 
seek to join a third party. Section 40 gives the parties right to agree on these provisions 
so the parties can limit or vary such powers if they wish either in their arbitration 
agreement or after the commencing the arbitration. 
3.3 Immunity of arbitrator 
Another new issue is the immunity of the arbitrator. All arbitrators sitting in Lagos State 
and under the LSAL will enjoy limited immunity. Such arbitrator shall not be liable for 
any act or omission done in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as 
arbitrator except if done in bad faith.'j4 It is particularly commendable that the LSAL 
makes express provision on this issue and further extends this partial immunity to the 
employees and agents (pursuant to the arbitral reference) of the arbitrator. This ensures 
that the arbitrator does not incur liability vicariously or under the principles of agency 
(as principal). Since either of these forms of liability will amount to a back-door means 
of holding the arbitrator responsible for the act or omission of such employees and 
agents. 
I49 Note that this requirement is not included in any part of the ACA. 
Note that under s 2 2 0 )  &I (4) ACA. reference is made to the tribunal's power to decide ex nequo et 
60110 only on the express authority of the parties and that the tribunal shall decide in accordance with the 
terms of the contract and take an!, relevant trade usages into account. No reference is made to the 
determination of the substantive choice of law. This is understandable since in domestic arbitration 
Nigerian law will apply. A detailed provision on choice of law1 for international arbitration is contained in 
s 47 AC A. 
151 See s 40 LSAL. There is no compar-able provision in the ACA. 
"' See s 40(2) LSAL. 
153 See s 40(3) LSAL. There is no comparable provision in the ACA. 
154 See s I8 LSAL. Note that s I & ? )  pl.eserve any liability incurred by the arbitrator as a result of his 
resignation. Such liabilities usually will be in the form of refund of any monies paid for which work had 
not been done as agreed with the parries. The .4CA does not make any provisions on the immunity o f  the 
arbitrator so that effectively the common law, \sill apply where the issue arises. 
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3.4 Interim Measures 
The ACA empowers the parties to request and the arbitral tribunal to grant interim 
measures of protection the tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject 
matter'55 but the LSAL contains more detailed provisions on interim measures and the 
enforcement of such measures. The LSAL helpfully defines interim measures as: 
any temporary measure . . . to maintain or restore the status quo . . . take an action that 
would prevent, or refrain from talung action that is likely to cause current or imminent 
harm or prejudice to the subject matter of the dispute or the arbitral process itself ... 
preserving assets . . . preserve evidence. 156 
As already mentioned power to grant interim measures is reposed in the Lagos H ~ g h  
Court. The arbitral tribunal also has powers to grant interim measures at the discretion 
of the parties.157 SO both the court and tribunal have doncurrent jurisdiction on this issue. 
In addition, the parties can agree that the arbitral tribunal at the application of one party 
can order the other party not to frustrate the purpose of the interim measure at the same 
time the measure is requested. This new power is geared towards giving teeth to the 
interim order made by the tribunal. However, it is arguably just another order which the 
responding party may equally decide to ignore. There is nothing coercive in the order 
itself so its relevance is doubtful. This is especially so since the LSAL envisages that an 
application would already have been made to the tribunal for a grant of interim 
measures. The bite of this request for a non-frustration order lies in the fact that it can 
be made ex parte before the service or hearing of the substantive application for the 
grant of interim measure. Thus this order will be granted and served upon the 
respondent at the same time as the application for the interim measures.'58 The ex parte 
application may unduly prejudice the respondent and may impinge on due process and 
his right to fair hearing which is a cardinal principle in a1-bitrati0n.l~~ TO ameliorate the 
possible hardship against the responding party the LSAL predicates the grant of the 
Preliminary Order on full disclosure by the party seeking the order,l6'and rovides for 
the Order to expire after 20 days from the date it was issued by the tribunal!'Moreover 
the arbitral tribunal is empowered to make this order 'if it considers that prior disclosure 
of the (ap lication) for interim measure risks frustrating the purpose of the 
16F 
measure'. Clearly the Lagos state legislator has tried to implement parts of the 
amended article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on interim measures. The right to 
make an ex parte application in a private process which relies heavily on equal 
treatment of the parties and transparency is yet to be tested in other jurisdictions and so 
it will be interesting to see how tribunals interpret and apply the section and the 
response of national courts. 
See s 13 ACA. 
156 See s 21(3) LSAL. This definition applies to the arbitral tribunal while the High Court can grant any 
interim measure it can under its ordinary jurisdiction under general law grant. 
15' See s 21 LSAL. 
See s 24(1) LSAL. 
See s 24(2), (3), (5) LSAL. 
160 See s 27 LSAL and note the cost implications under s 28 LSAL. 
16' See s 24(4) LSAL. 
162 See s 23(2) LSAL. Note that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to extend, modify, suspend or 
terminate the interim measures or preliminary order in accordance with s 25 LSAL. 
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The section restates the classic common law guidance on conditions for granting interim 
163 
measures of protection by a court. These are irreparable harm. balance of 
convenience, evidence of serious issue to be tried, provision for security for- costs.'64 
An interim measure granted by the arbitral tribunal is enforceable by the Lagos High 
165 Court in support of the arbitral tribunal and in aid to the disputing parties. It remains 
the responsibility of the party in whose favour the interim measure is granted to notify 
the court where the award is terminated, suspended or modified.166 
The LSAL also makes provisions for the recognition and enforcement of the award on 
interim measures. The party against whom the award was made can also challenge the 
award. The enforcement of the award may be refused where the party against whom it 
was made convinces the Lagos High Court of the existence of issues similar to those 
required for the challenge of the final award, or security was not provided as required 
by the arbitral tribunal and where the interim measure has come to an end through 
167 termination or suspension. The Lagos High Court is further empowered to refuse 
enforcement of the award where the 'interim measure is incompatible with the powers 
of the Court'. Alternatively the Court may 'reformulate the interim measures to adapt it 
to its own powers and proceedings for the purpose of enforcing and without modifying 
its substance'.'" These provisions raise a few issues for consideration, for example, 
where the measure is incompatible with the powers of the Court then of course the 
Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce it. Should the Court not therefore decline jurisdiction 
and remit i t  back to the arbitral tribunal? If the Court decides to reformulate the award, 
then i t  runs the risk of the award no longer being the 'decision of the arbitral tribunal' 
but that of the Court. This is so even though the section expressly stipulates that the 
substance of the order must not be modified. In this situation, it is difficult to see the 
jurisdictional basis on which the Court will purport to act. Clearly the arbitrator can 
hardly be said to have made the award on interim measures if it is 'reformulated' by the 
enforcing Court to give that Court jurisdiction to act w~thin its constitutional powers. 
This default is not cured by the addition of the words '... without modifying its 
substance' to the section. This is because it will usually be the substance of the award 
(as opposed to technical issues) that will fail the 'compatible with the powers of the 
Court' test. The other problem with this section is the fact that an award on interim 
measures is at best an interim order. It is not the final determination of the issues in 
dispute between the parties and the order can be varied (as clearly provided in LSAL). 
This raises the question why, as an inter~m order of the tribunal, the LSAL refers to the 
decision as an award and provides for its enforcement and setting aside. It may be more 
163 See for example "The Angelic Grace" [ 19951 I Lloyd's Rep 87 
164 See on security for costs s 26 LSAL. Note that where the arbitral tribunal does not require such 
security, the Lagos High Court may require i t  when i t  is requested to recognise and enforce the award on 
interim measures in accordance with s 29(3) LSAL. The Court can also require security where the award 
affects the interest of a third party. This the Court can do since i t  has a wider personal jurisdiction than 
the parties. 
I6j See s 29(1) LSAL. Though nor explicitly stated in the section. the award on interim measures is 
binding on the partie5 to 'he arbitration. This is based on the contractual nature of the process of 
arbitration. 
I" See s 29(2) LSAL 
I67 See s 30 LSAL. 
'" See s 30(1) (b)  LSAL 
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expeditious to provide for a party seeking enforcement of the t~ibunal's order granting a 
request for interim measures to approach the Lagos courts for such assistance without 
the need for the provision of an elaborate mechanism for its enforcement or setting 
aside as is currently provided for in LSAL. 
This is the most strilung of the novel provisions of the LSAL and though commendable, 
looks like a fertile ground for litigation before the courts. It is important that if a tribunal 
is empowered to grant interim measures, a practical method of enforcing such measures 
is also provided to make the power effective. However, in malung such provision due 
regard must be given to the very nature of arbitration as a private process and its innate 
limitations and the assistance courts can render to the process. The very nature of 
arbitration makes provisions on ex parte applications open to abuse. It is true that in 
certain cases the order sought may be very urgent and there is the need for surprise. 
However it is in such situations that the courts can effectively compliment the arbitral 
process through rendering assistance so that a party in need of an urgent order with an 
element of surprise should approach the courts for such orders and not the arbitral 
tribunal. 
Conclusion 
This critique has examined the relationship between the ACA and LSAL which is 
especially important in international arbitration references with seat in Lagos state or 
where enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is sought before the Lagos High Court. It 
has argued that the ACA still retains relevance especially in situations where there is a 
foreign element to the arbitral reference. 
There are several provisions on the arbitration agreement, arbitrators, arbitral procedure 
and awards where both legal regimes complement each other with little or no 
inconsistency but the LSAL as a more modem statute, bring much needed clarity to the 
law and fills gaps left in the ACA. There are also some new provisions which may be 
contentious and may possibly keep the Lagos High Courts busy for some time. The 
LSAL upholds the principle of party autonomy and strives to create a balance between 
the powers of the arbitral tribunal and role of the courts to assist all arbitrations subject 
to the LSAL. On this basis parties will be well advised to examine the LSAL before 
drafting their arbitration agreements and in choosing the appropriate a~bitration rules. 
